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FORESHADOWING THE FUTURE OF 
FORFEITURE/ESTOPPEL  
BY WRONGDOING:  
DAVIS V. WASHINGTON AND THE 
NECESSITY OF THE DEFENDANT’S INTENT 
TO INTIMIDATE THE WITNESS 
James F. Flanagan* 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Scalia’s refusal to define “testimonial” evidence or to 
explain the enigmatic reference to “forfeiture by wrongdoing” in 
Crawford v. Washington1 continues to raise significant practical 
and policy issues in the reformulation of the right of 
confrontation, particularly in domestic violence prosecutions. 
Forfeiture by wrongdoing is the most significant exception to the 
exclusion of testimonial hearsay. Despite its importance, the 
only reference to the doctrine in Crawford appeared in Justice 
Scalia’s discussion of the defects of the reliability standard of 
Ohio v. Roberts,2 and was addressed only to distinguish 
forfeiture’s essentially equitable rationale from Roberts’ 
reliability standard. The Court adopted it in a parenthetical 
without any discussion of its elements or the extensive case law 
on the topic. The discussion is short: “For example, the rule of 
                                                          
* Oliver Ellsworth Professor of Federal Practice, University of South 
Carolina. L.L.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1967; A.B., University of 
Notre Dame, 1964. My thanks to Professor Robert Pitler for including me in 
the seminar and to the participants who provided many helpful comments on 
the issues discussed in this article. 
1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes 
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not 
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability. See 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59, 25 L.Ed 244 
(1879).”3  
Crawford & Beyond: Revisited in Dialogue, the second 
Crawford focused symposium organized by Professor Robert 
Pitler at Brooklyn Law School and held on September 29, 2006, 
explored the developing scope of “testimonial” and also focused 
on the aforementioned exception to Crawford, the constitutional 
doctrine originally known as waiver by misconduct,4 and now 
commonly referred to as forfeiture by wrongdoing. 
This doctrine provides that a defendant who deliberately acts 
to prevent a witness from testifying loses any right to object to 
the admission of the witness’ testimonial hearsay statement on 
constitutional or evidentiary grounds.5 This doctrine has always 
                                                          
3 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
4 The modern case law, beginning in 1976, generally referred to the 
doctrine as “waiver”, although some cases used the term “forfeiture”, and 
others used both terms interchangeably. Federal Rule 804(b)(6) which 
codified the doctrine as a rule of evidence was originally titled “waiver by 
misconduct”, but was later changed to “forfeiture by misconduct.” James F. 
Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for 
“Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1193, 1209-18 
(2005) [hereinafter The Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by 
Wrongdoing]. 
5 Several pre-Crawford articles discuss the origins of the doctrine and its 
promulgation in Federal Rule 804(b)(6). See James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture 
by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in Witness Intimidation: A Reach 
Exceeding its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459 (2003) [hereinafter Forfeiture by 
Wrongdoing] (discussing the development, elements and procedure of the 
doctrine originally known as waiver by misconduct codified in Federal Rule 
of Evidence 804(b)(6)); Leonard Birdsong, The Exclusion of Hearsay 
Through Forfeiture by Wrongdoing—Old Wine in a New Bottle—Solving the 
Mystery of the Codification of the Concept into Rule 804(b)(6), 80 NEB. L. 
REV. 891 (2001); Enrico B. Valdez & Shelley A. Nieto Dahlberg, Tales from 
the Crypt: An Examination of Forfeiture by Misconduct and its Applicability 
to the Texas Legal System, 31 ST. MARY’S L. J. 99 (1999); Richard D. 
Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L. REV. 506 
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required that the defendant specifically intend to prevent the 
witness from testifying, and was previously limited to cases of 
deliberate witness tampering.6 However, Crawford’s 
characterization of this doctrine as “forfeiture” by wrongdoing 
has created an unfortunate misperception about its scope,7 
prompting some courts to expand the doctrine beyond its 
original use in witness tampering cases to admit any victim’s 
testimonial hearsay, provided the defendant can be found 
responsible for the witness’ unavailability to testify for any 
reason.  
This expansion of the doctrine thus creates a broad exception 
to the Confrontation Clause for all testimonial hearsay from an 
unavailable victim. In the lower courts, a conflict is emerging 
between this expanded rule of forfeiture and that expressed in 
Reynolds v. United States8 and the pre-Crawford cases, which 
held that the right of confrontation can only be lost by deliberate 
action aimed at preventing the witness from testifying.9  
This article focuses on the intent element of the constitutional 
forfeiture or estoppel by wrongdoing doctrine. Part I briefly 
                                                          
(1997) [hereinafter Chutzpa]; John R. Kroger, The Confrontation Waiver 
Rule, 76 B.U.L. REV. 835 (1996); Alycia Sykora, Forfeiture by Misconduct: 
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 75 Or. L. Rev. 855 (1996); 
Paul T. Markland, The Admission of Hearsay Evidence Where Defendant 
Misconduct Causes the Unavailability of a Prosecution Witness, 43 AM. U. 
L. REV. 995 (1994); David J. Tess, Losing the Right to Confront: Defining 
Waiver to Better Address a Defendant’s Actions and Their Effects on a 
Witness, 27 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 877 (1994). 
6 See infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text. 
7 Flanagan, The Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing, 
supra note 4, at 1218-23; infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text. 
8 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
9 Compare Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 (Mass. 
2005) (adopting specific intent to prevent testimony), and State v. Alvarez-
Lopez, 98 P.3d 699 (N.M. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1334, 1335 
(2005) (same) with People v. Giles, No. S129852, 2007 WL 635716 (Cal. 
Sup. Ct. March 5, 2007), (adopting strict forfeiture rule), cert. granted, 102 
P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004); Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W. 3d 603, 610 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2004) (adopting strict forfeiture rule), aff’d, No. PD-0247-05, 2006 WL 
1688345 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (advocating strict forfeiture rule but finding 
intent under the facts). 
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recapitulates the doctrine’s development, with emphasis on the 
principal precedent, Reynolds v. United States,10 and follows 
with the effect that Crawford’s brief reference to the doctrine 
has had by implying that it could be used in any case in which 
the defendant can be held responsible for the witness’s 
unavailability for any reason. Part II analyzes the post-Crawford 
opinion in Davis v. Washington11 and concludes that the Court 
views the doctrine as directed against witness tampering, which 
is consistent with the pre-Crawford case law that required the 
defendant’s intent to prevent testimony. Part III then addresses 
some procedural issues the Court will have to consider as it 
further defines the doctrine, including the causal link between 
the defendant’s acts and the witness’s unavailability for trial, the 
need for a hearing to determine admissibility, and whether 
additional foundation evidence beyond the hearsay itself is 
necessary to admit victim hearsay. Finally, Part III addresses the 
point that, under current applications of the doctrine, the finding 
that the defendant was responsible for the witness’ unavailability 
to testify not only allows the prosecution to admit the absent 
witness’ hearsay, but under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a), 
precludes the defendant from offering any of the victim’s 
hearsay. This article argues that the defendant’s right to present 
a defense, most recently reaffirmed in Holmes v. South 
Carolina12 overcomes this rule of evidence, so that a defendant 
cannot be precluded from offering admissible evidence under 
that rule simply because he was the procuring cause of the 
witness’ unavailability. 
                                                          
10 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145. 
11 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2270 (2006). 
12 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1729 (2006). 
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I.  ESTOPPEL BY WRONGDOING AND CRAWFORD’S EXPANSIVE 
EFFECT ON THE DOCTRINE 
A.  Short Note on Terminology and the Tyranny of Labels 
Words matter, and this article deliberately uses the term 
“estoppel by wrongdoing” to describe the doctrine by which a 
defendant may lose his right to confrontation by acting against a 
witness, rather than the term used by Justice Scalia in 
Crawford—“forfeiture by wrongdoing.”13 The principal reason 
is to avoid what Justice Cardozo called the “tyranny of 
labels.”14 The key issue in determining the scope of the doctrine 
is the necessity of the defendant’s intent to prevent the witness 
from testifying. Labeling the rule as one of forfeiture all but 
assumes that intent is irrelevant to the loss of the right to 
confrontation. The term forfeiture connotes an automatic and 
unintentional loss of a right upon the happening of a specified 
condition.15 The courts reaching this decision after Crawford 
rely heavily on the term forfeiture to justify that result.16 
Moreover, this simplistic analysis makes it easy to ignore the 
historical and constitutional reasons for an intent element. I have 
argued that the constitutional doctrine is better viewed as one of 
waiver,17 but using that term may be viewed as assuming my 
                                                          
13 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
14 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934), overruled by 
Mallow v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1978). 
15 Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of 
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 1214-
15 (1977) (distinguishing between constitutional rights that may be 
unknowingly forfeited by a guilty plea from constitutional rights that can only 
be deliberately waived based upon the interest of the state in being able to 
retry the defendant). 
16 See, e.g., People v. Giles, No. S129852, 2007 WL 635716 at *9 
(Cal. Sup. Ct. March 5, 2007) (rejecting defendant’s argument that doctrine 
is based on waiver by pointing to term “forfeiture” used in Crawford). 
17 Flanagan, The Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing, 
supra note 4, at 1203-23 (tracing the history of the doctrine from its English 
antecedents to modern case law, the adoption of FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6), 
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conclusion, just as forfeiture assumes that intent is irrelevant. To 
avoid a debate dominated by value laden terms, the Article uses 
the more neutral and more accurate name of estoppel by 
wrongdoing. Crawford mentioned its equitable origins18 and 
Professor Friedman has argued that the doctrine is based on 
estoppel.19 Estoppel accommodates both waiver and forfeiture 
while also incorporating the rich traditions of equity that may be 
necessary to define the contours of this important constitutional 
doctrine.20 I will refer to the rule that one may lose 
confrontation rights by conduct against witnesses as one of 
estoppel by wrongdoing, or of confrontation estoppel, unless 
direct citation requires otherwise. 
B.  A Short History of the Constitutional Doctrine of 
Estoppel by Wrongdoing 
Reynolds v. United States21 is the principal Supreme Court 
precedent used to determine whether the defendant loses the 
right to confrontation because of conduct against a witness. 
Reynolds was a case of “intentional” witness tampering because 
the defendant deliberately concealed the location of his second 
wife during a bigamy prosecution to prevent her from being 
subpoenaed in his second trial. The Court found that his acts 
were an intentional waiver of his right to confrontation. Chief 
Justice Waite noted that Reynolds had been given every chance 
to reveal the location of the witness, but chose not to do so: 
“Having the means of making the necessary explanation, and 
having every inducement to do so if he would, the presumption 
                                                          
and to Crawford and arguing that the cases are based on express or implied 
waiver, and that the description as “forfeiture” was made erroneously and 
without analysis). 
18 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
19 Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 5 at 516-17. 
20 Flanagan, The Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing, 
supra note 4, at 1241-45 (arguing that equitable considerations help define the 
doctrine, and may impose obligations on the prosecution when it seeks to 
invoke it.). 
21 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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is that he considered it better to rely upon the weakness of the 
case made against him than to attempt to develop the strength of 
his own.”22 The opinion also used an estoppel rationale based 
upon the defendant’s deliberate choice to conceal the witness. 
The Constitution “grants him the privilege of being confronted 
with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the 
witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege.”23 The Court 
also stated that the doctrine is triggered by the defendant’s 
wrongful act: “The rule has its foundation in the maxim that no 
one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong; and, 
consequently, if there has not been, in legal contemplation, a 
wrong committed, the way has not been opened for the 
introduction of the testimony.”24 The admitted wrong in 
Reynolds was the defendant’s deliberate concealment of the 
witness, which supported the waiver and estoppel rationales. 
The constitutional rule stated in Reynolds was that a 
deliberate intention to prevent a witness from testifying supports 
the loss of confrontation as to that witness. This principle had 
little impact until the Sixth Amendment became applicable to the 
states nearly 90 years later in the 1960s.25 In the 1970s, the 
lower courts began facing deliberate witness tampering in drug 
                                                          
22 Id. at 160. 
23 Id. at 158. The Court also recognized that the judicial process had 
legitimate and lawful responses to such conduct. “If therefore, when [the 
witnesses are] absent by [the defendant’s] procurement, their evidence is 
supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his 
constitutional rights have been violated.” Id. The modern cases, faced with 
more brutal organized crime and drug conspiracies see witness tampering as a 
direct attack on the judicial system. See e.g., United States v. White, 116 
F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that the “forfeiture principle, as 
distinct from the Confrontation Clause, is designed to prevent a defendant 
from thwarting the normal operation of the criminal justice system); United 
States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 
U.S. 1204 (1984) (describing the murder of a witness as “behavior which 
strikes at the heart of the justice system itself”). 
24 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159. 
25 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (“We hold today that 
the Sixth Amendment’s right of an accused to confront the witnesses against 
him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by 
the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
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and organized crime cases and the prosecution often offered the 
absent witness’ hearsay. The courts used Reynolds to resolve the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment claims by concluding that 
deliberate witness intimidation waived the right of 
confrontation.26 
As in Reynolds, the modern cases all involved acts against 
declarants because of their status as witnesses. All the cases 
mentioned the victim’s status as an actual or potential witness or 
the defendant’s acts against a witness.27 As in Reynolds, the 
rationale was that the defendant expressly or implicitly waived 
the right by deliberate conduct inconsistent with actually desiring 
to confront that witness.28 No pre-Crawford case held that the 
Confrontation Clause was satisfied merely because the defendant 
was the procuring but unintentional cause of the witness’ 
absence.29 In fact, the courts refused to extend estoppel by 
                                                          
26 Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, supra note 5 at 466-69. 
27 See, e.g., United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 
1996) (stating that “intent to deprive prosecution of testimony need not be the 
actor’s sole motivation.”); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 
1992) (stating test is whether defendant procures a witness’ absence); United 
States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 788 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating defendant 
waives confrontation right “when his own conduct is responsible for a 
witness’ unavailability at trial”); Rice v. Marshall, 709 F.2d 1100, 1101 (6th 
Cir. 1983) (stating declarant was an expected witness against defendant), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 
269, 271 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating declarant was murdered on way to testify); 
United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that a 
“defendant who causes a witness to be unavailable for trial for the purpose of 
preventing that witness from testifying also waives his right of 
confrontation”); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1198-98 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(stating that defendant has procured his wife’s refusal to testify); United 
States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating “the law should 
not permit an accused to subvert a criminal prosecution by causing witnesses, 
not to testify at trial”) (emphasis added); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 
1346, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting that defendant acted only when he learned 
that declarant was going to testify at his trial). See also, United States v. 
Jordan, No. Crim, 04-CR-229-B 2005 WL 513501 at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 3. 
2005) (stating that no Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) case holds that a murder 
whose byproduct is the unavailability of a witness is covered by the rule). 
28 Id. 
29 A few pre-Crawford cases, taken in isolation, may be viewed as 
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wrongdoing to ordinary manslaughter cases,30 or to apply it 
when the defendant acted for reasons unrelated to potential 
testimony.31 Thus, the Supreme Court in Reynolds, as well as 
federal and state appellate courts, articulated and applied a 
constitutional standard based on express or implied waiver or 
estoppel inferred from the defendant’s knowing misconduct 
against a potential witness. This approach was consistent with 
prior constitutional cases because the Supreme Court has always 
viewed the loss of confrontation rights as based on principles of 
                                                          
supporting a true forfeiture theory. One court held that a defendant’s slaying 
of a government agent in an exchange of gunfire during a bungled arrest was 
sufficient to avoid a Confrontation Clause claim. Interestingly, the court 
described it as a waiver of his right of confrontation. United States v. Rouco, 
765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985). Another speaks of the doctrine without 
mentioning an intent to prevent testimony. See United States v. Emery, 186 
F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (convicting defendant of intentionally 
tampering with declarant/witness under federal witness tampering statute). 
United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 648 (2d Cir. 1997) (suggesting that 
intent was relevant but not necessary). 
30 Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1064 n.4 (Pa. 2001) 
(rejecting misconduct exception in manslaughter prosecution); Wyatt v. State, 
981 P.2d 109, 115 n.11 (Alaska. 1999) (recognizing that forfeiture by 
misconduct does not apply to domestic homicide); Cf. State v. Jarzbek, 529 
A.2d 1245, 1253 (Conn. 1987) (stating that “The constitutional right of 
confrontation would have little force, however, if we were to find an implied 
waiver of that right in every instance where the accused, in order to silence 
his victim uttered threats during the commission of the crime for which he is 
on trial.”); People v. Maher, 677 N.E.2d 728, 731 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that 
the exception does not apply to murder unrelated to testimony). People v. 
Flowers, 667 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (App. Div. 1997) (same). See also 
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 175 (Mass. 2005) (refusing to 
apply forfeiture doctrine to defendants who did not arrange for witness’s 
absence). 
31 United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding 
that accessory who did not threaten defendant did not waive confrontation 
rights); United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. 352, 363-64 (D. Mass. 
1995) (holding that codefendant Fitzgerald participated in murder as favor for 
another gang but did not intend to prevent victim from testifying); State v. 
Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96, 105-06 (Minn. 1981) (finding no proof that this 
defendant threatened witnesses). 
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waiver, express or implied, rather than a true forfeiture.32 
Furthermore, the estoppel or waiver rationale was doctrinally 
necessary to address Confrontation Clause claims because the 
reliability standard of Ohio v. Roberts33 was inapplicable to 
victim hearsay offered under estoppel by wrongdoing. As Justice 
Scalia noted in Crawford, there was never a claim that 
intimidated witness statements were reliable,34 and this evolving 
doctrine could not be considered a “firmly rooted” hearsay 
exception. Lacking any claim of reliable hearsay to satisfy 
Roberts, the only rationale to support the loss of confrontation 
rights was waiver or estoppel. 
In practice, however, constitutional analysis became largely 
irrelevant. With estoppel by wrongdoing the courts soon 
concluded that a factual finding of witness tampering resolved 
both constitutional and evidence claims, shifting the focus to the 
evidence of witness tampering.35 Roberts essentially eliminated 
confrontation claims arising from other hearsay because its 
reliability standard was easy to meet under the rules of 
evidence.36 Thus, confrontation issues became evidence issues.37 
                                                          
32 Flanagan, The Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing, 
supra note 4, at 1223-31. 
33 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Prior to Roberts the courts seemed to be using a 
reliability standard. See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1357-58 
(8th Cir. 1976) (discussing indicia of reliability); Mueller & Kirkpatrick, 
EVIDENCE § 8.85 at 971 (3rd ed. 2003) (noting that the Court favored the 
reliability standard). 
34 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
35 United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1979) (“A 
valid waiver of the constitutional right is a fortiori a valid waiver of an 
objection under the rules of evidence.”). Other courts quickly followed 
Balano. See United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982); 
United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921 926-27 (8th Cir. 1999); United States 
v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911-12 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Houlihan, 92 F.3d. 1271, 1279-80 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Aguiar, 
975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992). 
36 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62-69. 
37 Several of the speakers at the symposium noted this trend. See 
Margaret Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A 
Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557 (1992); 
Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 
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Reflecting this trend, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 
originally titled Waiver by Misconduct but promulgated as 
Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, was adopted in 1996.38 Nevertheless, 
both the evidence rule and the constitutional rule required a 
specific intent to procure the unavailability of the witness.39 
Similarly, the states adopted an intent element when they 
promulgated rules of evidence40 or adopted the estoppel doctrine 
by judicial decision.41 Consequently, the rules of evidence stated 
the constitutional standard for loss of confrontation rights.42 
                                                          
GEO. L. REV 1011 (1998); Randolph A. Jonakait, The Right to Confrontation: 
Not a Mere Restraint on Government, 76 MINN. L. REV. 615 (1992). 
38 Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of 
April 22, 1996. 
39 See Id. The rule does not exclude as hearsay any “statement offered 
against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was 
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” 
Id. See generally, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
40 MIL. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); UNIF. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); DEL. R. EVID. 
804(b)(6); HAW. R. EVID. 804(b)(7); MICH. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); N.D. R. 
EVID. 804(b)(6); OHIO R. EVID 804(B)(6); PA. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).TENN. R. 
EVID. 804(b)(6) (deleting “acquiescence”). The governor of Maryland 
proposed a comparable provision in 1994, but it was not adopted. Paul W. 
Grimm & Jerome E. Deise, Jr., Hearsay, Confrontation, and Forfeiture by 
Wrongdoing: Crawford v. Washington, A Reassessment of the Confrontation 
Clause, 35 U. BALT. L.F. 5, 41 (2004). After Crawford, Oregon amended its 
version of the evidence rule to delete the intent requirement when the party 
caused the witnesses’ unavailability by criminal conduct. OR. REV. STAT. 
40.465. California enacted an estoppel provision in 1985 that was more 
restrictive than rule 804(b)(6). CAL. EVID. CODE § 1350. 
41 See Steele, 684 F.2d at 1199-1200 (noting unreported Ohio Court of 
Appeals opinion admitted evidence because of threats); State v. Valencia, 924 
P.2d 497 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Devonshire v. United States, 691 A.2d 165, 
166 (D.C. 1997); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 2000); State v. 
Gettings, 769 P.2d 25 (Kan. 1989); State v. Magouirk, 539 So. 2d 50, 64-66 
(La. Ct. App. 1988) (on rehearing); State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208, 213-14 
(Minn. 1980); State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1984) (applying wavier by threats to overcome defendant’s objections to use 
of video by child witness); Matter of Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 460 
N.Y.S.2d 591, 597-98 (App. Div. 1983). 
42 Some courts depreciate the importance of Rule 804(b)(6) in 
determining the constitutionality of the doctrine of estoppel by wrongdoing by 
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Thus, the history of estoppel by wrongdoing from Reynolds to 
the modern case law, including the rules of evidence, always 
required the defendant’s knowledge of the declarant’s status as a 
witness and intentional efforts to prevent that witness from 
testifying. 43 
Crawford did not discuss or change the constitutional 
standard for estoppel by wrongdoing. In the two sentences that 
mentioned the doctrine, Justice Scalia cited as authority only 
Reynolds, a witness tampering case. Perhaps relying on the title 
of Rule 804(b)(6), however, he referred to the doctrine as 
forfeiture by wrongdoing,44 which had immediate consequences. 
Forfeiture implied that intent was irrelevant, and that 
confrontation rights could be terminated whenever the witness’ 
absence could be traced to the defendant, although a by-product 
and unintended consequence of the defendant’s act.45 In 
particular, it suggested that confrontation rights could be lost, 
not only in witness tampering cases, but in any prosecution 
where the defendant could arguably be found responsible for the 
witness’ absence. Professor Richard Friedman had argued that 
the intent to prevent testimony was unnecessary for forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.46 Moreover, some language in Reynolds, if it were 
                                                          
arguing that a constitutional standard should not depend upon the “vagaries of 
the Rules of Evidence.” United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 
(6th Cir. 2005). In doing so, they ignore the history which clearly shows that 
the evidence rule is the constitutional standard. 
43 See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text. 
44 The two sentences were short and enigmatic. “For example, the rule 
of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation 
claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an 
alternative means of determining reliability. See Reynolds v. United States, 
98 U.S. 145, 158-59, 25 L.Ed 244 (1879).” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 
(2004). 
45 Adam M. Krischer, Though Justice May be Blind, It Is Not Stupid, 38 
PROSECUTOR 14 (Nov. Dec. 2004) (arguing that perpetrators of domestic 
violence automatically forfeit their right to confront their victims). 
46 Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 5, at 518 n. 25 (taking into account 
defendant’s accidental collision affecting witness on way to court); Id. at 519 
n. 30 (noting that legitimate advice to claim a privilege may avoid forfeiture 
only if witness is a close relative). Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) used the term in 
the title, and it first appeared in a footnote in an opinion where the Sixth 
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freed from its facts and the other rationales that supported the 
decision, seemed to justify a strict approach because “no one 
shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.”47 Since 
Crawford directly impacted domestic violence prosecutions, it 
was inevitable that the outer limits of forfeiture would be 
emphasized in those cases.48 
The immediate reaction of some state courts was the 
application of estoppel by wrongdoing to homicide cases, in part 
because this approach avoided difficult decisions on what 
constitute testimonial statements.49 The first case interpreting 
                                                          
Circuit mused about its underlying rationale, while finding specific intent to 
prevent the witness from testifying in that case. Steele, 684 F.2d at 1201 n.8. 
47 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159. 
48 Much of the commentary after Crawford focused on domestic violence 
cases and the utility of the forfeiture exception in those prosecutions. See, 
e.g., Jeanine Percival, The Price of Silence: The Prosecution of Domestic 
Violence Cases in Light of Crawford v. Washington, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 212 
(2005); Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too, 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 311 (2005); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After 
Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005); Matthew M. Stabb, Child’s Play: 
Avoiding the Pitfalls of Crawford v. Washington in Child Abuse Prosecution, 
108 W. VA. L. REV. 501 (2005); Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. 
Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecution? 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 301 
(2005); Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and 
Trustworthiness Exceptions After Crawford, 20 CRIM. JUST. 24 (2005); Adam 
M. Krischer, Though Justice May be Blind, It Is Not Stupid, 38 PROSECUTOR 
14 (Nov. Dec. 2004); Allie Phillips, A Flurry of Court Interpretations: 
Weathering the Storm After Crawford v. Washington, 38 PROSECUTOR 37 
(Nov./Dec. 2004). 
49 Many of the post-Crawford cases used forfeiture to avoid the 
testimonial issue. United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 
2005) (avoiding decision on whether excited utterance was testimonial); 
People v. Baca, No. E032929 2004 WL 2750083 at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 
2 2004) (avoiding whether identification was testimonial); People v. Jiles, 18 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 790, 795 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (avoiding issue of dying 
declaration as testimonial); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 793-94 (Kan. 2004) 
(avoiding issue of whether response to police question was testimonial); 
People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (avoiding issue 
of whether casual statements to police are testimonial); Gonzalez v. State, 
155 S.W.3d 605, 609 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (avoiding issue of whether 
statements to police were testimonial). 
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Crawford, State v. Meeks,50 was decided six weeks after 
Crawford. In Meeks, the Supreme Court of Kansas admitted the 
homicide victim’s identification of his assailant.51 The court 
extended earlier witness tampering precedent in Kansas to 
uphold the introduction of the decedent’s identification of his 
assailant, principally relying on the maxim that “the law simply 
cannot countenance a defendant deriving benefits from 
murdering the chief witness against him.”52 The California 
Court of Appeals had a similar response in People v. Giles,53 a 
domestic homicide case where it was conceded that there was no 
evidence that the defendant killed the victim to prevent her 
testimony.54 The court peremptorily rejected the defendant’s 
argument that such proof was required by precedent, in favor of 
an argument relying on forfeiture principles.55 The California 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision, again relying principally 
on its title as a forfeiture.56 Several other state courts57 and at 
                                                          
50 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004). 
51 Id. at 792-93. 
52 Id. at 794; State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 28 (Kan. 1989). 
53 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 843 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2004), aff’d No. S129852, 
2007 WL 635716 at * 9 (Cal. Sup. Ct. March 5, 2007), 
54 Id. at 848. 
55 Id. The court further noted that: 
Although the [Houlihan] opinion contains language suggesting 
that a killing must be motivated by a desire to silence the victim 
to trigger a forfeiture of the right of confrontation, we see no 
reason why the doctrine should be so limited to such cases. 
Forfeiture is a logical extension of the equitable principle that no 
person should benefit from his own wrongful acts. A defendant 
whose intentional criminal act renders a witness unavailable for 
trial benefits from his crime if he can use the witness’s 
unavailability to exclude damaging hearsay statements by the 
witness that would otherwise be admissible. This is so whether 
or not the defendant specifically intended to prevent the witness 
from testifying at the time he committed the act that rendered 
the witness unavailable. 
Id. at 843, 848, 848n.3 (citing U.S. v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st 
Cir. 1996)). 
56 “Defendant’s argument relating to the intent requirement rests on the 
premise that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is, in essence, not based 
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least one federal court58 also adopted the strict view that any act 
by the defendant which had the effect, albeit unintended, of 
preventing testimony would trigger a forfeiture of confrontation 
rights. As in Meeks and Giles, these courts relied on the 
argument that the defendant should not benefit from his 
wrongful conduct, ignoring the witness tampering facts in 
Reynolds and other cases that were based on principles of waiver 
and estoppel flowing from the defendant’s voluntary choice.59 
                                                          
on broad forfeiture principles, but instead on waiver principles. . . . 
However, the United States Supreme Court has characterized the rule in 
question as a ‘forfeiture’ that ‘extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially 
equitable grounds,’ not a waiver (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at [p. 62, 124 
S. Ct. 1354).” People v. Giles, No. S129852, 2007 WL 635716 at * 9 (Cal. 
Sup. Ct. March 5, 2007). 
57 People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1, 5 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Gonzales v. 
State, 155 S.W. 3d 603 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, No. PD-0247-05 2006 
WL 1688345 (Tex Crim. App. 2006) (finding intent to prevent testimony and 
deferring decision on whether such intent is required); State v. Jensen, 727 
N.W.2d 518 (Wisc. 2007). 
58 United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2005). 
59 Id. (arguing that the defendant, regardless of intent, “would benefit 
through his own wrongdoing if such a witness’ statements could not be used 
against him); People v. Baca, No. E032929 2004 WL 2750083 at *12 n.6 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (questioning intent element by contending that if the 
forfeiture rule is to further the maxim that “no one shall be permitted to take 
advantage of his own wrong (citation omitted) than the motivation for the 
wrongdoing is irrelevant.”); People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1, 5 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2004) (stating that under the forfeiture rule a person is not to benefit from his 
wrongful prevention of testimony); Gonzales v. State, 155 S.W.3d. 603, 610 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (adopting language of People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 848, that a defendant whose wrongful act renders a witness unavailable 
for trial benefits from his conduct if he can use the witness’ unavailability to 
exclude otherwise admissible hearsay statements regardless of intent). The 
maxim also is cited in many cases where the intent to prevent testimony was 
required. In those cases, however, the courts also referred to waiver, 
estoppel, and other rationales that emphasized the deliberate nature of the act. 
E.g., United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 652 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing 
maxim and equity and need for fit incentives for defendants); United States v. 
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding waiver by deliberate 
murder of witness and citing maxim); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 
269, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing maxim but remanding for consideration of 
whether defendant waived right by participating in murder of witness in any 
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This post-Crawford case development expanded the doctrine 
beyond prior precedent and history, creating new questions for 
the Court to address.  
II.  DAVIS V. WASHINGTON—FORESHADOWING THE FUTURE OF THE 
ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE 
Davis v. Washington60 was the Supreme Court’s first return 
to Crawford and provided an opportunity to address the scope of 
the terms “testimonial” and estoppel by wrongdoing. Justice 
Scalia authored the opinion as he had in Crawford, and he 
narrowed the definition of testimonial, all but stating that the 
estoppel doctrine is limited to witness-tampering cases.61 The 
issue in Davis,62 and its companion case Hammond v. Indiana,63 
was whether statements made in a 911 call in Davis, and at the 
crime scene in Hammond, were testimonial statements under 
Crawford.64 The majority drew the line based on the objective 
purpose of the inquiry. 
Statements are non-testimonial when made in the 
course of police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.65 
                                                          
way); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358-60 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(citing maxim and also stating that defendant waived right of confrontation by 
intimidation when he learned that witness would testify, as well as estoppel 
principles). 
60 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
61 See infra notes 70-92 and accompanying text. 
62 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 2270. 
65 Id. at 2273-74. 
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The Court in Davis held that the victim’s identification of 
her assailant to the operator in the initial stage of a 911 call was 
not testimonial because it was made to the operator during an 
ongoing emergency.66 The statements in Hammond, on the other 
hand, were deemed testimonial, having been made after the 
police arrived, had separated the husband-assailant from the 
victim, and learned from her that things were “fine.” The Court 
concluded that the police were not reacting to an emergency but 
were investigating and establishing the historical facts of the 
situation.67 Davis’ broad definition of testimonial statements 
reflects an expansive view of the Confrontation Clause. 
Perhaps anticipating criticism for the broad definition of 
testimonial statements, the Court discussed the estoppel by 
wrongdoing doctrine in section IV of its opinion in Davis. The 
states and others had argued that domestic violence cases 
required “greater flexibility in the use of testimonial evidence”68 
and that the higher incidence of witness intimidation in those 
cases required a narrow definition of testimonial. “When this 
occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives the criminal a 
windfall.”69 This windfall argument is another form of the 
rationale in Reynolds70 that “no one shall be permitted to take 
advantage of his own wrong” and is often relied upon to justify 
on strict forfeiture grounds the loss of confrontation rights in the 
all too typical domestic homicide case.71 
The Court rejected the windfall argument and its analogue, 
the benefits rationale: “We may not, however, vitiate 
constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing 
the guilty to go free.”72 Constitutional rights would have no 
meaning if they were available only when they provided no 
protection.73 Moreover, to consider constitutional rights as 
                                                          
66 Id. at 2276-78. 
67 Id. at 2278-79. 
68 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 (2006). 
69 Id. at 2280. 
70 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878). 
71 See supra note 61. 
72 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280 (citation omitted). 
73 Michael J. Polelle, The Death of Dying Declarations in a Post-
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benefits of the crime misstates their importance as fundamental, 
pre-existing protections inherent in citizenship.74 In rejecting the 
windfall and benefits arguments, the Court rejected the principal 
rationale underlying the strict rule of forfeiture, which views 
intent as irrelevant. 
The Davis opinion then discussed estoppel by wrongdoing in 
a context that emphasized its witness tampering underpinnings. 
But when defendants seek to undermine the judicial 
process by procuring or coercing silence from 
witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment does not 
require courts to acquiesce. While defendants have no 
duty to assist the State in proving their guilt, they do 
have a duty to refrain from acting in ways that 
destroy the integrity of the criminal-trial system. We 
reiterate what we said in Crawford; that “the rule of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing . . . extinguishes 
confrontation claims on essentially equitable 
grounds.”75 
That is, one who obtains the absence of a witness by 
wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.76 
The opinion identifies the evil addressed by the estoppel 
doctrine as acts that undermine the judicial process, specifically 
by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses. The terms 
“coercing” and “procuring” refer to intentional action 
specifically directed toward achieving a goal.77 In this context, 
                                                          
Crawford World, 71 MO. L. REV. 285, 308 (2006) (describing constitutional 
rights as virtual rights if they are forfeited at the point where they are most 
needed). 
74 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 829-30 (1975) (identifying 
notice, confrontation, and compulsory process as personal rights). 
Constitutional rights are not “benefits” of a crime. Defendants do not commit 
crimes to obtain constitutional rights. They are preexisting and inherent rights 
accorded defendants in our courts by the Constitution. 
75 541 U.S. at 62, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158-59). 
76 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280. 
77 Procure is defined as “to care for, take care of, attend to, look after; 
to put forth or employ care or effort; to do one’s best; to endeavor, labour, 
to use means; take measures.” VII Oxford English Dictionary (1989). Coerce 
is defined as: “to constrain or restrain (a voluntary or moral agent) by the 
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those terms describe purposeful acts intended to produce the 
silence of the witnesses. The words, and the Court’s discussion, 
are inconsistent with any theory that the defendant’s intent is 
irrelevant or that merely being the proximate cause of the 
witness’ unavailability is sufficient grounds to support the loss of 
confrontation rights. 
The paragraph’s focus on judicial integrity reflects the 
particularly heinous nature of witness tampering and its effect on 
the judicial process. Witness tampering attacks the judicial 
process because the consequences multiply beyond the original 
perpetrator and victim to other witnesses against that 
perpetrator, and its in terrorum effect reverberates among all 
those who might testify against violent criminals. Not only may 
the defendant be guilty of the original crime, but witness 
intimidation is an additional violation that makes it more difficult 
to prosecute the first crime, as well as the subsequent 
intimidation of the witnesses to that crime. In contrast, an 
ordinary homicide, while a tragedy for the victim and the family 
and a crime against society that demands prosecution, is not an 
attack on the judicial process, which remains available and 
unhindered in determining if criminal sanctions are appropriate. 
By pointing to the judicial process, the Court necessarily 
limits estoppel by wrongdoing to the defendant’s deliberate acts 
taken after the crime because of the victim’s status as a potential 
witness, and intended to prevent that testimony. The judicial 
process begins with the crime and includes the investigation that 
gathers the evidence and introduces it at trial.78 Justice Scalia 
                                                          
application of force, or by authority resting on force; to constrain, to compel 
obedience by forcible means.” Id. at Vol. III. 
78 The judicial process includes pre-indictment activity because 
Constitutional rights, such as the Fourth Amendment, provide constant 
protection and are enforced later at the trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961) (suppressing evidence seized as the result of an illegal search). 
Likewise, the Miranda warnings, and Due Process restrictions against 
suggestive photographic or lineup identifications, apply before formal charges 
are instituted. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring warnings 
about self-incrimination and right to counsel when questioned in custody); 
Simmons v. United States, 590 U.S.377 (1968) (holding that impermissibly 
suggestive identifications are subject to the Due Process Clause if made 
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states that constitutional rights are balanced with responsibilities. 
The defendant does not have to cooperate with the state in either 
the investigation or the trial.79 The state may not compel self-
incrimination,80 and at trial the defendant may stand mute81 and 
the government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.82 But neither may the defendant interfere with 
the state’s efforts by making witnesses to the crime unavailable. 
“One who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing 
forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.”83 The Court is 
clearly speaking of the post-crime activities of the defendant. 
The estoppel doctrine applies only when the defendant interferes 
with the judicial process; there is no suggestion that it applies 
when the defendant’s acts toward the victim are unrelated to 
potential testimony. Any homicide investigation and prosecution 
by its nature takes place without the decedent, but the 
commission of that crime has never been considered sufficient to 
automatically lose any constitutional right, including the right of 
confrontation.84 If it were, it would smack of dispensing with 
                                                          
before counsel appointed). The Sixth Amendment protections of the right of 
counsel, to proper venue, and to confrontation, are trial rights that are 
triggered by the formal charges. The estoppel doctrine also applies before 
arrest or formal charges. It even applies although an investigation is not 
pending, and there is no indictment, so long as the defendant acts because 
there is a possibility that the witnesses would testify. United States v. Miller, 
116 F.3d 641, 668 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that an ongoing criminal 
proceeding in which declarant was to testify is not required); United States v. 
Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279-80 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding estoppel by 
wrongdoing applies to potential witnesses). It would be an artificial 
distinction to suggest that witness intimidation before arrest, arraignment, or 
indictment is not an attack on the integrity of the judicial system. 
79 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280. 
80 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
81 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that the 
defendant’s right not to testify includes the right not to have comment on that 
decision). 
82 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is required by the Due Process clause). 
83 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280. 
84 The dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule may also be an 
exception to the testimonial standard established by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 
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constitutional rights because of a defendant’s obvious guilt. Even 
those post-Crawford cases that argue for a strict forfeiture 
rationale do not justify it as an attack on the judicial process. 
Rather, they maintain that the defendant should not benefit from 
his own wrongdoing,85 that is, the original homicide. 
The second paragraph of section IV of the Davis opinion 
provides direct evidence that the estoppel doctrine is limited to 
deliberate witness intimidation. 
We take no position on the standards necessary to 
demonstrate such forfeiture, but federal courts using 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which codifies 
the forfeiture doctrine, have generally held the 
Government to the preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard. State courts tend to follow the same 
practice. Moreover, if a hearing on forfeiture is 
required, Edwards, for instance, observed that 
‘hearsay evidence, including the unavailable witness’s 
out-of-court statements, may be considered.’ The 
Roberts approach to the Confrontation Clause 
undoubtedly made recourse to this doctrine less 
necessary, because prosecutors could show the 
‘reliability’ of ex parte statements more easily than 
they could show the defendant’s procurement of the 
witness’s absence. Crawford, in overruling Roberts, 
did not destroy the ability of the courts to protect the 
integrity of their proceedings.86 
That the opinion states that Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(6) codifies the constitutional estoppel by wrongdoing 
doctrine necessarily means that it is aimed at witness tampering, 
and that it also includes the specific intent requirement found in 
that rule. The Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence concluded early in its discussions that “codifying the 
                                                          
n.6. But it has never been viewed as forfeiture of constitutional rights. The 
homicide is only one element of the exception, and standing alone, does not 
lead to the admissibility of the dying declaration. See infra notes 105-110 and 
accompanying text. 
85 See supra note 61. 
86 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280 (citations omitted). 
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doctrine was desirable as matter of policy in light of the large 
number of witnesses who are intimidated or incapacitated so 
they do not testify.”87 The rule was a direct response to almost 
20 years of federal case law dealing with witness intimidation in 
organized crime and drug conspiracies. As drafted and as 
adopted, the Rule always required that the defendant specifically 
intend to prevent the witness from testifying.88 The Advisory 
Committee thought that the limited application of the Rule was 
so clear that it rejected a comment to the Rule specifically 
mentioning witness tampering.89 Given the rejection of the 
windfall argument, the focus on judicial integrity, and the 
statement that Rule 804(b)(6) codifies that doctrine, the only 
logical conclusion is that estoppel by wrongdoing is limited to 
witness tampering just as the Federal Rule is so limited.90 
                                                          
87 FED. R. EVID. 804 Advisory Committee’s Note (May 4-5, 1995). The 
Advisory Committee Note to the Rule also identified witness-tampering as its 
rationale. “This recognizes the need for a prophylactic rule to deal with 
abhorrent behavior ‘which strikes at the heart of the justice system itself.’” 
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984). Mastrangelo involved a witness killed on his 
way to testify. Id. 
88 Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, supra note 5, at 477-79. The 
final Rule differed from the initial draft only in that it referred to “forfeiture” 
rather than waiver by wrongdoing, and changed the language from “a party 
who has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing,” to “a party that” to clarify 
that the rule also applied to the government. Id. at 478-79. 
89 Minutes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence 
(Apr. 22, 1996). 
90 Additional, although limited, circumstantial evidence comes from the 
cases mentioned in the last paragraph. All involved witness tampering or 
significant questions of intent. Reynolds, of course, was a witness tampering 
case. The Court also cited Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 172 
(2005), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court adopted the estoppel 
doctrine, including the requirement that the defendant must intend to prevent 
the witness from testifying. Id. at 175. Also mentioned was Scott v. United 
States, 284 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2002) which applied only Federal Rule 
804(b)(6) because the defendant did not assert a confrontation claim. Id. at 
762. In both cases there was evidence of the defendant’s desire that the 
witness not testify, and of contact with the witness, but there were difficult 
questions of whether the witness elected not to testify for independent reasons 
that were not chargeable to the defendant. Thus, all the estoppel cases cited 
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The second paragraph of section IV of the Davis opinion 
discusses procedural issues. The Court notes that both state and 
federal courts generally require the government to demonstrate 
the elements of estoppel by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Furthermore, Justice Scalia states that if a hearing is required on 
the issue, at least one state supreme court permits the use of 
hearsay evidence, including the absent declarant’s hearsay 
statements, in determining the hearsay’s admissibility. Neither of 
these issues is particularly controversial and the Court approved 
of the preponderance standard on questions of the admissibility 
of evidence in Bourjaily v. United States.91 Similarly, Federal 
Rule of Evidence 104(a) authorizes courts to consider the 
statement itself in determining its admissibility, except in cases 
of privilege. Most courts have thus adopted the preponderance 
standard,92 although some have applied higher standards.93 
Generally, trial judges have considered the estoppel issues in a 
separate hearing.94 The proffered victim hearsay is often 
                                                          
in Section IV involved deliberate witness-tampering, which is unlikely to be a 
coincidence. 
91 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). 
92 United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 
624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 
1982); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982); State 
v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 29 (Kan. 1989); State v. Magouirk, 539 So. 2d 50, 
64-66 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
93 The Fifth Circuit initially adopted the “clear and convincing” standard 
in United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. 1982), as did a few 
other federal courts. United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. 352, 360 (D. 
Mass. 1995), aff’d in result but using preponderance standard, 92 F.3d. 
1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Smith, 792 F.2d 441, 442 (4th 
Cir. 1986). The drafters of Federal Rule 804(b)(6) rejected a higher standard 
and adopted the preponderance standard which most courts were using. 
Minutes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence (May 
4-5, 1995). New York state courts adopted the clear and convincing standard. 
People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 822 (N.Y. 1995). 
94 United States v. Price, 265 F.3d 1097, 1100 (10th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d. 811, 813 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Thai, 
29 F.3d 785, 814-15 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 
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important and the testimony and arguments can be a mini-trial of 
the defendant’s responsibility for the act. Some courts, such as 
the Second Circuit and the high courts of New York and 
Massachusetts, require a hearing,95 while other courts do not.96 
The discussion of estoppel by wrongdoing in Davis supports 
only the proposition that the Court believes that an intent to 
tamper with a witness is a prerequisite to the application of the 
estoppel doctrine, and that acts that have the unintended 
consequence of making the witness unavailable, as in an 
ordinary homicide case, do not result in the forfeiture of the 
right to object to victim hearsay. The Court did not explicitly 
hold that intent was required, but by finding that Federal Rule 
804(b)(6), which contains that element, codifies the doctrine, it 
came as close to that conclusion as possible. Likewise, the 
Court’s view that the doctrine is aimed at attacks on the judicial 
integrity of the system implicitly excludes ordinary criminal acts 
against individuals that unintentionally make the person 
unavailable as a witness. This result is consistent with the prior 
case law on estoppel, and with the Court’s view that 
Confrontation rights must be waived, whether explicitly or 
                                                          
47 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Smith, 792 F.2d 441, 442 (4th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Houlihan, 887 F.2d 352, 356 (D. Mass. 1995); United States v. White, 838 
F. Supp. 618, 621 (D.C. 1993); United States v. Papadakis, 572 F. Supp. 
1518 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389 
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57, 61 (N.D. Ga. 
1979). 
95 United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 656 (2d Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Miller, 116 F.3d. 641, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding error to admit 
hearsay evidence without evidentiary hearing, but harmless under the facts of 
this case); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 175 (Mass. 2005); 
People v. Johnson, 711 N.E.2d 967, 968-69 (N.Y. 1999) (holding that 
hearing required unless overwhelming evidence supports clear and convincing 
link between defendant and witness’ unavailability). 
96 See United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 356 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(using meeting with counsel to discuss proof); United States v. Emery, 186 
F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (admitting evidence subject to later proof of 
witness’ murder); Crutchfield v. United States, 779 A.2d 307, 329-32 (D.C. 
2000) (approving proffer of expected testimony). 
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implicitly, to be lost; they cannot be lost simply because there is 
evidence that the defendant committed a crime.97 Completely 
missing from the discussion is any hint that intent is irrelevant to 
the estoppel doctrine, or that forfeiture follows automatically 
from a determination that the defendant is responsible for the 
witness’ unavailability. Davis seems to have clearly adopted the 
intent to prevent testimony element. For the Court to reverse 
course at this point would require a major reformulation of the 
rationale and purpose of the estoppel doctrine, and the rejection 
of the well established historical record that admitted absent 
witness hearsay only when the defendant intended to prevent the 
witness from testifying.98 
Moreover, a rejection of the intent element would also 
abandon Crawford’s grounding in the history of the 
Confrontation Clause. All of the English and early American 
cases cited in Reynolds were witness tampering cases.99 Nor 
does English history provide any basis for the true forfeiture 
doctrine espoused in some post-Crawford cases. At the time the 
Bill of Rights was drafted, English law provided only two 
instances in which an unavailable victim’s statement could be 
admitted against a defendant as substantive evidence, neither of 
which provides any support for a true forfeiture principle.100 
Sworn depositions in felony cases produced in conformity with 
the Marian statutes could be admitted if the witness was dead or 
unable to appear, but not merely because the witness was 
                                                          
97 Flanagan, The Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing, 
supra note 4 at 1223-29. 
98 The Court is speaking with one voice on this issue, as it did when it 
accepted the estoppel by wrongdoing doctrine in Crawford. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor concurred in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69-76, 
and Justice Thomas concurred only in Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280-85. Both 
opinions discussed the estoppel doctrine using the collective “we” and the 
concurring justices did not comment on the estoppel doctrine in either case. 
99 Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, supra note 5 at 462-66. 
100 Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design:” How the Framing-
Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” 
Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & 
POL’Y 349 (2007). 
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unavailable.101 Crawford, however, squarely held that the 
Confrontation Clause was directed against the Marian statutes, 
and particularly the creation of uncross-examined evidence by 
the government.102 
The dying declaration provided the other means to admit 
absent victim hearsay as substantive evidence. As a principle of 
evidence, the dying declaration is based on the declarant’s 
knowledge of impending death. 
The principle of this exception to the general rule is 
founded partly on the awful situation of the dying 
person, which is considered to be as powerful over 
his conscience as the obligation of an oath, and partly 
on the supposed absence of interest on the verge of 
the next world, which dispenses with the necessity of 
cross-examination. But before such declarations can 
be admitted in evidence against a prisoner, it must be 
satisfactorily proved, that the deceased, at the time of 
making them, was conscious of his danger, and had 
given up all hope of recovery.103 
As Professor Davies has noted, English law treated the 
statements by one full of awe at approaching death as the 
functional equivalent of a statement taken under oath.104 Thus, 
the dying declaration and the Marian statutes were sufficient to 
take these statements out of the rule that prohibited the 
admission of unsworn statements.105 Courts in America accepted 
dying declarations,106 and the Supreme Court recognized this 
                                                          
101 Id. (discussing the Marian statutes, 1 & 2 Phil. & M. c. 13 (1554);, 
2 & 3 id., c 10 (1555) that where adopted during the reign of Mary Tudor 
and permitted use of hearsay without confrontation); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
43-44 (same). 
102 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51. 
103 JOHN F. ARCHBOLD, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO 
PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES; WITH PRECEDENTS OF 
INDICTMENTS, &C. AND THE EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THEM 200-01 
(1824). 
104 Davies, supra, note 100. 
105 Id. at 95. 
106 The early evidence texts refer to it. ARCHBOLD, supra note 103 (“the 
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exception to the Confrontation Clause based on its history. The 
Court referred to the admissibility of dying declarations from 
“time immemorial,” asserting that “no one would have the 
hardihood at this day to question their admissibility.”107 
The dying declaration is not a precursor to the forfeiture 
doctrine. It is based on the inherent reliability of the dying 
declarant’s statement, and not upon the defendant’s intent to 
prevent testimony found in Reynolds, or on the forfeiture 
analysis that emerged after Crawford. At most, the dying 
declaration exception supports the proposition that some limited 
victim hearsay as to the cause of death could be deemed 
consistent with the Confrontation Clause. To transmogrify it into 
a justification for the forfeiture principle shifts its rationale from 
the mental state of the declarant to the act of the defendant 
(regardless of the mental state) and expands a narrow exception 
for explaining the cause of death in only homicide prosecutions 
to a general rule which would admit all victim statements for 
any purpose. These structural changes are far beyond the history 
and precedent of the dying declaration.108 Despite the rise of the 
                                                          
dying declarations of the deceased are receivable in evidence, if it appear that 
he was conscious of his being in a dying state at the time he made them”); 
CHITTY, Vol. 1 A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 569 (1841) 
(stating that the dying declaration is the “one great and important exception” 
to the hearsay rule); PEAKE, COMPENDIUM ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 14-16 
(3rd ed. 1812) (dying declaration admissible “for murder where the deceased, 
while in the declared apprehension of death, or in such imminent danger of it 
as must necessarily have raised that apprehension in his mind”); PHILLIPPS, 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 275-200 (1816) (“The dying 
declarations of a person who has received a mortal injury, are constantly 
admitted in criminal prosecutions.”). 
107 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895). 
108 Professor Richard Friedman suggests that dying declarations may be 
better rationalized as an example of the forfeiture principle. He argues that 
this approach preserves the clarity and simplicity of the “testimonial” 
approach, avoids an exception based on history, and accepting the traditional, 
and unpersuasive, argument for the reliability of dying declarations. Richard 
D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores 
Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUSTICE 4, 12 (Summer 2004). 
Certainly, a true forfeiture principle would subsume dying declarations, but 
that is using the post-Crawford appearance of the true forfeiture argument 
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forfeiture argument in the 1990s and its adoption by some post-
Crawford cases, the limited exception of the dying declaration 
does not provide any historical justification or pedigree for the 
modern forfeiture doctrine. 
 
III.  FORESHADOWING THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE ESTOPPEL BY WRONGDOING 
A.  The Intent Element and the Link Between the Defendant’s 
Act and the Witness’s Refusal to Testify 
Davis answers the most pressing issue about the 
constitutional doctrine of confrontation estoppel: the intent 
element. The doctrine requires proof of intent to prevent 
testimony before a defendant can lose the right to confront a 
witness or object to a hearsay statement by a victim. However, 
the nexus between the defendant’s acts and the witness’ refusal 
to testify is not well defined in the case law. A few courts have 
held that the defendant has the intent to prevent testimony if the 
victim’s potential testimony was “a factor” in the decision to act 
against the witness.109 Another formulation asks whether witness 
intimidation was in “any way” a motivation.110 At the same 
time, the courts have specifically rejected any requirement that 
witness tampering be the sole motive for intimidation.111 The 
courts do not seem to have addressed the link in the context of 
                                                          
today to rationalize the long history of dying declarations that were 
admissible under a different theory than forfeiture. It does not establish that 
forfeiture is derived from the exemption for dying declarations. 
109 United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 356 (4th Cir. 2000). 
110 State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 856 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d. 
No. 29,690 (N.M. March. 15 2007), http://www.suprementcourt.nm.org/ 
slipopinions, cert. granted, 134 P.3d 120 (N.M. 2006). 
111 United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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the witness’ decision, perhaps because there was generally 
strong proof that the defendants caused the witness’ 
unavailability for trial. 
Basing a loss of constitutional rights whenever witness 
tampering was “a” factor in the defendant’s decision is a test so 
flexible and so easily satisfied that it suffers from the same 
defect that Crawford found in the reliability standard of Ohio v. 
Roberts.112 Applied strictly, a minimal test of causation means 
that intimidation and refusal will produce forfeiture even though 
the wrongful acts were not a primary or even a significant 
reason for either the defendant’s threats or the witness’ refusal 
to testify. A stronger causal connection between the defendant’s 
act and the witness’ response is necessary. Moreover, the issue 
of intent is so critical that other procedural protections are 
necessary. A hearing should be required before admitting these 
statements, and the victim’s hearsay statement itself should not 
be the sole basis for admitting it.113 
B.  The Nexus Between the Defendant’s Intention and Act 
and the Witness’ Refusal to Testify 
The homicide case Gonzalez v. State illustrates the potential 
for the marginalization of the intent element as well as the need 
for a strong causal connection.114 The Texas Court of Appeals 
initially held that the intent requirement was unnecessary.115 On 
appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, that court noted 
the competing arguments regarding the intent element, but 
avoided the issue by finding that the defendant had the requisite 
intent when the defendant killed the victims during a burglary 
                                                          
112 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 62-69 (discussing defects of Roberts reliability test). 
113 See, e.g, Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to 
Confrontation, SYMPOSIUM MATERIALS at 202 n.80) (suggesting the need for 
an evidentiary hearing on the estoppel argument). 
114 Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W. 3d 114 (Tex Crim. App. 2006). 
115 Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W. 3d 603 (Tex. App. 2004), aff’d, No. 
PD-0247-05, 2006 WL 1688345 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
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and theft.116 The facts, fairly interpreted, do not show intent to 
prevent witness testimony. The defendant entered a home near 
that of his grandmother and fatally wounded Maria and 
Baldomero Herrera before stealing their truck.117 Mrs. Herrera 
identified the defendant to the responding officer by his unusual 
hair color and his relationship to a neighbor. Gonzalez was 
arrested the same day driving the pickup truck with Mr. 
Herrera’s address book in his pocket and Mrs. Herrera’s blood 
on his clothes.118 Other than seeing each other in the area, the 
defendant and his victims apparently had no prior contact, and 
there was no pending matter about which they would testify 
against the defendant. Nevertheless, the court found that the 
killing was intended to prevent testimony simply because the 
victims could identify him.119 
The court’s conclusion was based on three elements: (1) the 
victims could identify the defendant because of his distinctive 
hair color and relationship to a neighbor; (2) the defendant 
entered their home without a disguise; and (3) the murders were 
particularly violent, as both victims were shot at close range.120 
None of these factors is characteristic of intent to prevent 
testimony, nor do they distinguish between a murder motivated 
by expected testimony and one motivated by greed, rage, or 
revenge. In fact, the same arguments support a finding of intent 
to prevent testimony in every homicide. Here the victims did 
have a preexisting basis to identify the defendant, but all 
surviving crime victims have the potential to identify the 
perpetrator. Therefore, if these victims are killed in the course 
of a crime, all defendants can be assumed to have the requisite 
intent to prevent testimony. Likewise, the defendant’s lack of 
disguise is not a reliable indicator of the defendant’s motivation 
for the crime. Here, the court found the lack of disguise proof 
of the defendant’s awareness of the risk of identification, which 
                                                          
116 Gonzalez, 2006 WL 1688345 at *2-7. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at *1-3. 
119 Id. at *7. 
120 Id. 
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supplied a motive to satisfy the estoppel rule. However, a 
defendant’s decision to wear a disguise would reflect greater 
concern about possible identification, and arguably an even 
greater motive to silence the witness. Intent, then, can be found 
regardless of the presence or absence of a disguise. Finally, and 
unfortunately, murders, particularly first-degree double murders 
by gunshot, are inevitably violent acts. Characterizing a murder 
as a violent act is not an adequate premise for a finding of intent 
to prevent the victims from testifying. The court clearly assumed 
the intent element by an extremely tenuous causal chain that will 
supply the requisite intent for estoppel by wrongdoing in any 
violent homicide. 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Texas’ highest 
criminal court, had obvious reasons for its specious reasoning. 
The assumption of witness tampering intent allowed the court to 
avoid both speaking on an issue the Supreme Court had yet to 
address and reversing a conviction for a heinous crime when 
there was little doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Even assuming 
that these are legitimate motives, the case also illustrates the 
pressures that courts face in ruling on proof of intent and the 
strong desire to find a way to admit evidence that is clearly 
testimonial. Routine acceptance of such reasoning will leave the 
intent element with little meaning or effect, and estoppel by 
wrongdoing will swallow Crawford’s revitalized Confrontation 
Clause in domestic violence cases. Similarly, a standard of 
causation that requires only that potential testimony be a factor 
in the defendant’s act eliminates the causation element even 
when there are other, much more likely reasons for the act. 
The more common and more difficult question of causation 
arises when the witness could testify but does not, leaving the 
court to determine whether the witness’ refusal is due to 
defendant’s acts or the witness’ own unrelated reasons. The 
witness’ motivation is always an issue, even if the Court 
ultimately concludes that estoppel by wrongdoing does not 
require the defendant to intend to prevent the witness from 
testifying. In every claim of confrontation estoppel there must 
always be proof that the defendant’s act was the procuring cause 
of the witness’ refusal to testify. Estoppel cannot be applied if 
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the defendant’s threats were made well before the crime against 
the potential witness121 or were not received by the victim.122 
Likewise, when the witness refuses to testify for his own 
reasons, the defendant cannot be estopped to object to the 
hearsay.123 
Domestic violence prosecutions are the most problematic 
because many victims—by some accounts 80 to 90 percent—do 
not cooperate with the prosecution.124 Consequently, some have 
                                                          
121 State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 856 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, 
No. 29,690 (N.M. March 15, 2007), http://www.suprementcourt.nm.org/ 
The slip opinion presents these facts because the defendant’s threats were 
made three months before the couple met during the holidays. Despite the 
fact that the defendant had threatened her about going to the police three 
months before, it strains logic to conclude that the homicide involved in the 
case was related to these threats in any way. The New Mexico Supreme 
Court remanded the case for a determination of the defendant’s intent while 
noting that it was unlikely that he had the intent to prevent her from 
testifying. Id. at 15. 
122 State v. Washington, 521 N.W.2d 21, 42 (Minn. 1994) (finding no 
proof that declarant heard threats). 
123 United States v. Williamson, 792 F. Supp. 805, 810 (M.D. Ga. 
1992) (noting that evidence that defendant paid witness’ attorneys fees 
insufficient to show that defendant had procured witness’ unavailability 
through witness’ assertion of Fifth Amendment because he had independent 
reason to refuse to testify because testimony could affect pending appeal), 
aff’d, 981 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 512 U.S. 594 
(1994). 
124 While it is uncontested that many domestic violence victims do not 
cooperate, the authorities do not define what cooperation means or indicate 
what percentage may be attributed to the defendant or to the election of the 
victim. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 576 (Cal. 2004) (noting 
that an expert testified that 80-85 percent of victims recant at some point); 
People v. Gomez, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (noting 
that an expert witness testified that 80 percent of domestic violence witnesses 
recant, change, or minimize the incident); Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, 
Let the Truth be Told; Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic 
Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements As Substantive Evidence, 11 
COLUM J. GENDER & L. 1, 3-4 (2002) (citing expert testimony); Lisa Marie 
De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for 
Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 359, 367 (1996) 
(citing interview with prosecutor in contact with expert witnesses throughout 
the country) 
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argued that a battering relationship should be sufficient to 
conclude that the defendant was the cause of the witness’ 
decision, and consequently he has no right of confrontation 
regarding that victim’s hearsay.125 This argument is wrong in 
theory and in practice because it necessarily requires evidence 
that every battering relationship produces unavailability. Without 
a precise one-to-one relationship between abuse and 
unavailability, an unknown number of defendants would 
arbitrarily lose their Sixth Amendment rights. There is no 
dispute that a large number of victims in battering relationships 
do not testify, but correlation is not causation. 
Logically, there are three potential causes for a witness’ 
failure to testify when available: (1) the defendant’s actions; (2) 
the witness’s independent decision; and (3) actions of third 
parties or other intervening events, including the state’s failure 
to bring the witness to court.126 Commentators recognize that 
defendants are not the only cause of the failure of witnesses to 
testify and that witnesses often refuse to testify because of 
legitimate concerns about privacy, possible self-incrimination, 
prior inconsistent statements, or the desirability of preserving 
pre-existing relationships.127 Mere reluctance to testify128 should 
                                                          
125 Andrew King-Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: A Panacea for 
Victimless Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 469-
70 (2006); Adam M. Krischer, Though Justice May be Blind, It Is Not 
Stupid, 38 PROSECUTOR 14 (Nov. Dec. 2004). 
126 United States v. Olivares, 1997 WL 257479, at *2 (S.D.N.Y 2004) 
(holding that the government is responsible for absconding witness’ absence 
when it ignored statute requiring potential witness awaiting sentencing to be 
held pending sentence and released him).  
127 Tom Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There is a Confrontation Clause, 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 401, 407 (2005); Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational 
Approach to Confrontation, SYMPOSIUM MATERIALS, 177, 202 n.80 (2006) 
(citing Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: 
Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. 
L. REV. 311, 361-62 (2005)). 
128 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 856 (1990) (finding that special 
protections for child witness are not available solely because of the normal 
anxiety of testifying); Contreras v. State, 910 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 
2005) (holding that child witness is not unavailable because of generalized 
claims of trauma and mental anguish from testifying). 
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not be chargeable to the defendant under any reasonable theory 
of causation. The advocates for automatic loss of confrontation 
rights must establish this strong causal link to support that 
proposition.129 
As argued above, a causation test that is satisfied only by 
proof that the defendant’s act was “a” factor for the witness’ 
unavailability is too easily satisfied. There are great pressures to 
minimize the causal link because of the perceived need for the 
testimony, so it is necessary to clearly articulate this link if the 
intent element is to be meaningful. Proper application of the 
burden of proof standard requires articulating how it should be 
applied in this context. The preponderance standard is often 
viewed as requiring that the critical fact be “more likely than 
not” or “more probably true than not.”130 If the defendant’s 
conduct is more likely than not the cause of the witness’ 
unavailability, then other potential causes are by definition less 
likely, and vice versa. I suggest that courts articulate and apply 
a “but for” test when evaluating both the defendant’s motivation 
for acting against a person and the witness’ failure to testify. 
This test asks whether the defendant would have acted against 
the witness but for the potential for testimony against him. 
Similarly, it asks whether the witness would have testified but 
for the defendant’s intimidation. By articulating a test that 
focuses on the predominant factor, rather than just “a” factor, 
                                                          
129 Distinguishable from the argument that the battering relationship is 
per se proof of causation for witness unavailability, is the proposition that 
evidence of the nature of the battering relationship may be part of the proof 
that establishes the defendant’s responsibility for the witness’ refusal to 
testify. Professor Tuerkheimer argues persuasively that an understanding of 
the domestic relationship is essential to a proper evaluation of the evidence 
about the cause of a refusal to testify, and places in context acts that 
otherwise might seem benign or unrelated to the potential testimony. Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to Confrontation, SYMPOSIUM 
MATERIALS at 177. Professor Tuerkheimer makes clear that specific 
causation must be established between the defendant and the victim’s refusal 
to testify, and as I understand her position, views evidence of the battering 
relationship as necessary to understand the evidence, but not sufficient in 
itself to establish the cause of the witness’ refusal to testify. Id at 202. 
130 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, EVIDENCE, §3.3 at 109 (3d ed. 2003). 
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the courts can directly address the causal link and will be less 
likely to marginalize the intent element, and more likely to seek 
evidence to support the conclusion.131 
Of course, issues of proximate cause are difficult to capture 
completely in words, many issues of fact are difficult to 
quantify, and any language is likely to be somewhat imprecise. 
However, such language is important because it provides 
guidance to the court in close cases. Articulating a test that 
emphasizes the causal link between the defendant and the 
witness is particularly important with confrontation estoppel 
because admissibility issues are subject to review under the 
abuse of discretion standard, which is highly deferential to the 
trial judge.132 For all but the rare case, the trial judge’s decision 
on questions of causation will survive on appeal, and words that 
convey more than a minimal connection are necessary to prevent 
an over-broad estoppel by wrongdoing doctrine. 
Another reason for a clearly articulated causation test is the 
state’s role in the trial process. The Sixth Amendment places the 
obligation on the government to produce the witnesses at trial.133 
Although the constitutional standard is low and requires only a 
good faith effort to obtain the presence of the witness,134 a 
minimal causation element for estoppel by wrongdoing further 
reduces the government’s obligation, and has the perverse 
incentive of undermining the government’s desire to search out 
and find the witness when testimonial hearsay is available. 
Officers and prosecutors need not further investigate the crime, 
and the trial may be easier because the prosecution introduces 
                                                          
131 See United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(remanding for hearing to determine if defendant in custody was responsible 
for murder of witness), on remand, 561 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(ruling that evidence of prior statements and acts supported waiver of hearsay 
and constitutional rights) aff’d, 722 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming after 
remand). 
132 Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 
F.R.D. 173 (1978). 
133 Barber v. Paige, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (noting that the government 
was required to produce witness whose location was known). 
134 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980). 
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testimonial hearsay through law enforcement personnel who may 
be perceived to be neutral and more credible than the declarant, 
and the hearsay cannot be modified or recanted by the absent 
declarant.135 Several commentators at the Crawford symposium 
noted the desirability of an enhanced standard for determining 
the unavailability of a witness. A strong causal requirement for 
confrontation estoppel advances this goal and emphasizes the 
need for sufficient proof to support confrontation estoppel. 
C.  Declarant Hearsay as the Foundation for Admissibility of 
Victim Hearsay 
Justice Scalia noted in Davis that other courts have 
considered hearsay, including victims’ statements, in 
determining the elements of confrontation estoppel.136 In many 
cases, the declarant’s own statements are the only proof 
establishing the defendant’s responsibility for the witness’ 
absence and in particular the fact that the defendant’s act was 
motivated by a desire to prevent testimony.137 Unresolved is 
whether the declarant’s hearsay statements can be the sole 
                                                          
135 Muller & Kirpatrick opine the following: 
Of course a prosecutor who has useful hearsay might prefer to 
offer it, since bringing the speaker to court may be hard or 
costly or time-consuming. Disappointing as well: The speaker 
may be frightened or reluctant, and testifying visibly on the 
record under oath and subject to cross may persuade him to 
back away from what was more easily said in private to a 
sympathetic audience of prosecutors and agents. Hence 
prosecutors sometimes prefer to offer statements rather than 
produce the speaker, and it is not always easy to distinguish 
between the effort one might make to find and produce a 
speaker and an effort to show he cannot be produced. 
Mueller & Kirkpatrick, EVIDENCE, § 8.87 at 977 (3d ed. 2003). 
136 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273; FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
137 United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Balano, 618 
F.2d 624, 628-29 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 
1353 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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foundation for their admissibility.138 Requiring independent 
evidence avoids the circular argument that inadmissible hearsay 
can be the foundation for admitting the otherwise inadmissible 
hearsay. More importantly, independent evidence enhances the 
reliability of the admissibility decision and of the evidence 
admitted, and becomes particularly important with confrontation 
estoppel because this exception is not founded on any claim that 
the hearsay is reliable, or that the circumstances in which the 
statements were made are inherently reliable. In fact, these 
testimonial statements are often made by witnesses with 
conflicting interests.139 These arguments supported the 
amendment of Federal Rule 801(d)(2) in 1997 to provide that the 
hearsay statement of a co-conspirator, agent, or employee was 
not sufficient to establish the relationship necessary for 
admission against the principal.140 
                                                          
138 Compare U.S. v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 927 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(expressing doubt that foundation requires evidence independent of the 
hearsay and finding sufficient independent evidence) with United States v. 
White, 116 F.3d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (leaving undecided whether 
foundation can rest exclusively on hearsay). The testimony sometimes 
includes double hearsay. See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1207 (6th Cir. 
1982) (Taylor, J., dissenting) (noting that declarant’s statements were of what 
she had heard other defendants say); Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 226 
(2d Cir. 2003) (noting that officers testified to the defendant’s statements that 
he had heard that his family was threatened and to the statements of the 
defendant’s mother and sister about threats they received). 
139 Many declarants in drug and organized crime cases are co-
conspirators who have their own reasons for cooperating with the government 
that may affect the reliability of their statements. Flanagan, Forfeiture by 
Wrongdoing, supra note 5 at 471 n. 71-72. See State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 
842, 863-64 (N.M. 2006), cert. denied 134 P.3d 120 (N.M. 2006) (noting 
that untrue and self-serving statements are made in domestic violence 
prosecutions and citing cases). 
140 The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules recommended 
adopting the amendment to Rule 801(d)(2) and Rule 804(b)(6) at the same 
meeting but in separate discussions without any mention or indication in the 
minutes that the members saw the topics as related. Certainly there is no 
indication that the Committee rejected a requirement in Rule 804(b)(6) that 
there be some independent evidence of the predicate facts that support 
admitting the hearsay statements. Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, 
Minutes of the Meeting of May 4-5 1995. 
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The need for a clear articulation of the nexus between act 
and unavailability of the witness, and the need for a foundation 
based on more than hearsay itself, also suggests that a pre-trial 
hearing on the issue of confrontation estoppel is necessary. The 
Court highlighted, but did not decide the issue in Davis.141 
While an absolute rule requiring a hearing may generate 
problems in isolated cases, the arguments in favor of a hearing 
are persuasive. The major problems in the application of 
confrontation estoppel revolve around proof of the appropriate 
connection between the defendant’s acts and the witness’ 
unavailability. In every case there must be proof of intent to 
prevent testimony, and likewise, if the victim refuses to testify 
that it was the result of that intimidation. The case law suggests 
that when hearings are held and the issues addressed directly, 
sufficient evidence to support the forfeiture doctrine is 
available.142 
D.  Estoppel by Wrongdoing and Rule 804(a) 
The finding that the defendant procured the witness’ absence 
bars any objection to victim hearsay, and also precludes the 
defendant from introducing other hearsay statements of the 
unavailable victim under Rule 804(a).143 Even victim testimony 
                                                          
141 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80. 
142 Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, supra note 5, at 506 (reviewing 
evidence of Mastrangelo’s involvement developed on remand). 
143 FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5) (detailing that a witness is not unavailable if 
absence is procured by proponent of hearsay). The defendant may offer 
victim hearsay admissible under Rules 801, 803, or 807 because those rules 
do not have an unavailability requirement. Rule 106 allows the defendant to 
offer other portions of a written or recorded hearsay statement that are 
necessary to place the previously offered testimony in context. This is 
apparently so even if the latter statements are otherwise inadmissible. United 
States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1283 (1st Cir. 1996); See also Dale A. 
Nance, Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, 75 TEX. L. REV. 51 (1996). It does not authorize the admission 
of other parts of the statements that are neither explanatory nor relevant to 
the previously admitted portions of the testimony. United States v. Marin, 
669 F.2d 73, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. 
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that exculpates the defendant is barred because the prosecution 
retains its rights to object to hearsay proffered by the 
defendant.144 Holmes v. South Carolina145 suggests that this 
evidentiary limitation is unconstitutional. There, the Court held 
arbitrary and unconstitutional South Carolina’s rule barring the 
defendant from introducing evidence of a third party’s 
responsibility for the crime when the prosecution’s evidence of 
guilt was strong. The rule was justified on relevance grounds, 
but as the Court recognized, the fact that the prosecution’s 
evidence of guilt, if credited, was strong, does not mean that the 
defense evidence was not relevant and probative; in fact, when 
considered by a trier of fact, it might undermine the perceived 
strength of the government’s case.146 
The restriction in Rule 804(a) serves a legitimate function 
when the wrongdoer proffers the absent witness testimony first. 
At the time, it prevents that party from creating and then taking 
advantage of a witness’s absence to introduce hearsay, a less 
reliable form of evidence, and arguably provides some 
deterrence against such wrongdoing by others contemplating 
similar action. When applied after the prosecution has admitted 
victim hearsay under the estoppel rationale, the rule suffers the 
same defects found in Holmes. First, exclusion is not based on 
relevance or other Rule 403 grounds, but on the preliminary 
finding (by a preponderance of the evidence) that the defendant 
is responsible for the witness’s absence. Second, as in Holmes, 
it is arbitrary to argue that the strength of the government’s case 
justifies excluding the victim’s exculpatory statements when 
offered by the defendant. The strength of the government’s case 
can only be evaluated by considering all of the evidence, and the 
defense evidence might significantly undercut that finding. Even 
                                                          
352, 366 (D. Mass. 1995). 
144 United States v. White, 838 F. Supp. 618, 625 n.10 (D.D.C. 1993) 
(finding that only defendant waived right); Sweet v. United States, 756 A.2d 
366, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a defendant responsible for witness’s 
absence may not admit absent witness, exculpatory statement); Wisconsin v. 
Frambs, 460 N.W.2d 811 (Wisc. 1990) (same). 
145 126 S. Ct. 1727 (2006). 
146 Id. at 1734-35. 
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if the judge considered all of the victim’s statements in deciding 
the estoppel issue, the trier of fact must make the ultimate 
decision of guilt and innocence (beyond a reasonable doubt) and 
the rule prevents the jury from hearing admittedly relevant, 
probative, and exculpatory evidence that undercuts the 
government’s case. This infringes on the defendant’s right to 
present a defense, whether found in the Due Process Clause or 
the Sixth Amendment.147 The exclusion of exculpatory victim 
statements cannot be sustained by arguing that the rule retains a 
legitimate purpose at this point. The purpose of the rule has 
been served because the defendant was not able to proffer the 
victim’s statements first. As for deterrence, it strains logic to 
argue that the exclusion of evidence some months after the 
alleged wrongdoing serves any deterrence function for the 
defendant, nor does it genuinely serve a deterrent function for 
others who are unlikely to be deterred by the better known and 
more severe criminal law sanctions. Whatever shreds of 
justification survive the introduction of a victim’s testimony 
cannot outweigh the constitutional right to present a defense that 
includes other relevant, and potentially contradictory or 
exculpatory statements of the absent witness. 
Holmes, as applied to the last sentence of Rule 804(a), 
means that the defendant is not barred from asserting that the 
declarant is unavailable under that Rule. Admissibility of the 
absent victim’s statement depends upon satisfying one of the 
Rule 804 exceptions. Prior testimony, dying declarations, and 
statements against interest are now available to the defendant, 
and may be the basis of admitting other victim hearsay. The 
exception for prior testimony may be particularly useful because 
many prior victim statements might have been made in earlier 
proceedings, including preliminary hearings and grand juries.148 
                                                          
147 Id. at 1731. 
148 Rule 804(b)(1) requires that the testimony be in a proceeding in 
which the party against whom the testimony is offered “had an opportunity or 
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross or redirect 
examination.” United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 954 (6th Cir. 1997). 
There is case authority that grand jury testimony can be admitted against the 
government. Id. at 954-56. 
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Similarly, many victim statements arise in circumstances where 
the exculpatory value to the defendant exposes the declarant to 
potential criminal or civil prosecution. 
This issue also throws some light on the so-called 
“reflexive” use of victim hearsay in cases in which the 
defendant is charged with the crime that produced the witness’ 
unavailability.149 The concern is that the pre-trial ruling on the 
defendant’s responsibility for the crime will affect the trial of the 
case. The usual response is that the evidence decision is made 
by the judge, and the finding of guilt is made by the jury so that 
one does not affect the other.150 Rule 804 provides one instance 
in which the pre-trial finding does affect the jury by excluding 
exculpatory evidence offered by the defendant under that Rule, 
and where the judge would be aware of evidence favorable to 
the defendant but the jury would not. The solution is not to bar 
the reflexive use of the victim’s statements, but to admit all such 
victim statements that satisfy the rule regardless of the limitation 
in Rule 804(a). 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia’s decision to leave the key issues of the 
definition of testimonial and the scope of estoppel by 
wrongdoing to future opinions has led to great uncertainty about 
Crawford’s application in many circumstances. Davis provides a 
strong indication on the scope of estoppel by wrongdoing and all 
but holds that it is aimed at witness tampering and cannot be 
expanded to apply when the defendant’s actions have the 
                                                          
149 Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 5, at 521-25. 
150 Id. at 23-24. Courts have had little problem with the reflexive use of 
victim hearsay. See e.g., United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814 (2d Cir. 
1994) (murder as part of extortion); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 
(2d Cir. 1992) (showing conspiracy to import heroin and witness tampering); 
United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. 352, 355-56 (D. Mass. 1995) 
(showing drug conspiracy and murder in furtherance of racketeering); United 
States v. White, 838 F. Supp. 618, 625 (D.D.C. 1993) (noting that 
declarant’s statement were admissible as if declarant was testifying in court). 
Generally the jury would be aware of the reasons for the declarant’s absence 
in those cases. 
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unintended effect of making a witness unavailable. This will be 
controversial because Crawford has its greatest impact on 
domestic violence prosecutions and there is great pressure to 
admit the absent victim testimony. At the same time, 
confrontation is a core value of the Constitution. Crawford has 
made the Confrontation Clause meaningful as to testimonial 
statements. Moreover, the Court seems to have rejected an 
argument based solely on the need for the testimony. The need 
argument was raised, but as Justice Scalia noted in Davis: “We 
may not, however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they 
have the effect of allowing the guilty to go free.”151 
Constitutional rights that provide no protection have no 
meaning. As the constitutional doctrine of estoppel by 
wrongdoing develops, the courts will have to address this intent 
element, and the nexus between the defendant’s acts and the 
witness’ decision not to appear or testify. Proper proof of this 
link, as well as the procedural protections of a pretrial hearing 
and a requirement of evidence in addition to the hearsay 
statement itself to support admissibility appear necessary to the 
proper operation of estoppel by wrongdoing. 
                                                          
151 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280 (citation omitted). 
